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The Zeebrugge and Ostend Raids
Benoit Strubbe
The Belgian ports of Zeebrugge and 
Ostend posed a serious threat to the Allied 
forces during the First World War. Their 
location, near the mouth of the Thames and 
the English Channel, would make these 
ports the best-situated operating bases for 
the German U-boat and torpedo boat fleet. 
Moreover, Bruges was connected to both 
Zeebrugge and Ostend via a canal. This 
way a good hiding place for the vessels of 
Marinekorps Flandern could be developed 
out of range of the British guns. During the 
war, German ships operating from these 
Belgian ports were responsible for one third 
of the tons of shipp ing lost by the Allies.
At the same tim e, connections across the 
Channel were essential to the Allies, not just 
as a supply line to bring in fresh troops but 
also for communication and the provisioning 
of the British Isles. In response to the 
German naval threat, the British Dover Patrol 
tried to block the ports of Zeebrugge and 
Ostend in the night of 22 to 23 April as well 
as the night of 9 to 10 May 1918. To protect their U-boats, the Germans built a U-boat bunker in the Bruges harbour. It was 




The activities of Marinekorps Flandern 
conducted from the Belgian ports had the 
potential of being strategically decisive. Yet 
it took the British until late 1917 to realise 
the seriousness of the threat and decide to 
blockade the ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend 
from the sea. To explain this hesitancy it is 
necessary to take the overall development of 
the Great War into consideration.
When WWI broke out in 1914, the 
optim istic idea was prevalent that the war 
would be short. Both sides were convinced 
of a sw ift and glorious victory. The goal of 
the German Schlieffen Plan to elim inate the 
French land forces by sweeping through 
Belgium and Luxembourg, and to take the 
Channel ports in France to facilita te an 
attack on Britain was not achieved. The 
German advance was halted by flooding 
part of the Yser plain, among other factors. 
The Germans had only succeeded in taking 
Zeebrugge and Ostend. At first, the British 
did not wish to destroy these ports as they 
assumed they would soon be recaptured. The entry o f  the N a v y  Division in Brussels (Imperial W ar Museums, Q 4 9 1 4 7 }
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A  few  German torpedo boats o f  the Flanders Flotilla heading for the English coast 
(Tolhuis Provincial Library/
Zeebrugge and Ostend could then be useful 
for supplying the A llied troops. The Germans 
also considered these ports to be only a 
temporary stopover. Zeebrugge and Ostend 
had fallen Into German hands relatively 
Intact, but no defences were present and 
the ports were not equipped for mooring, 
repairing and m aintaining a war fleet.
Flemish ports become crucial
The In itia l optim ism wore off as 
manoeuvre warfare gave way to trench 
warfare In late 1914. Many British ships 
shelled the Belgian coast to prevent the 
Germans from using the harbours of Ostend, 
Zeebrugge and Bruges. The Germans 
understood that the conquest of the Channel 
harbours In France would not come soon.
The well-equipped port of Antwerp, captured 
by the Germans, could not be used since 
using the Scheldt river would vio late Dutch 
neutrality, which the Germans wanted to 
avoid. For this reason, and for fear of an 
Allied landing, Marinekorps Flandern started 
to expand the coastal and port defences In 
and around Zeebrugge and Ostend. From 
1915 onwards, several batteries were bu ilt 
to repel the British shellings. It became 
Increasingly d ifficu lt to shell the ports from 
the sea. The German U-boats and torpedo 
boats could now be deployed more often and 
more effic iently from Zeebrugge and Ostend. 
The British, to whom Channel shipping 
was crucially Important, were In favour of 
attacking the left flank of the front, close 
to the coast, to be able to shell the Belgian 
ports from land. The French, on the other 
hand, wanted to focus on the Inland front. 
The more experienced French got the ir way, 
the British plan was not Implemented for the 
time being.
The threat o f the Flanders Flotilla
Up to 1916 the Imperial German Navy 
had m ostly Invested In the High Seas Fleet 
[Hochseeflotte) and the naval forces In 
the Baltic, while Marinekorps Flandern 
was subordinated. This attitude gradually 
changed after the Battle of Jutland (31 
May - 1  June 1916). Although the Germans 
had gained a tactical victory at this battle, 
the British blockade of the High Seas Fleet 
was maintained. Germany now realised 
that th is blockade would probably never 
be broken and decided to Invest part of the 
resources earmarked for the main fleet In 
the Belgian coast. They tem porarily added 
two torpedo boat flo tillas  to the Marinekorps  
Flandern fleet. This enabled the corps to 
take the offensive. This Increased and more 
aggressive activity from the Belgian ports 
gave rise to concern among the British 
general staff. This concern grew when 
Germany announced It would engage In 
unrestricted submarine warfare In early 
1917. The German U-boats wreaked havoc 
and spread panic In the North Sea and the 
English Channel. In 1917 alone, ha lf of the 
to ta l tonnage of Allied ships was sunk. It 
was not just U-boats that sunk more and 
more ships. In late 1916 and early 1917 the 
Germans organised several torpedo boat 
raids In the Channel. The Flanders Flotilla  
was now capable of d isrupting the v ita l 
communication and supply line between 
Britain and the Continent. This ever greater 
threat made the British realise that a final 
solution had to be found for the ports of 
Zeebrugge and Ostend.
A new attempt was made to break out 
o f the trench deadlock at the Battle of 
Passchendaele or Third Battle of Ypres 
(31 July -  6 November 1917). The British 
high command aimed at breaking through 
the front near Passchendaele In order to 
eventually retake the Belgian ports. This
offensive failed, however. The front line 
had only advanced a few kilometres at 
the expense of hundreds of thousands 
of casualties. The plan to capture the 
Belgian ports from land was consequently 
abandoned. It was equally Impossible 
to destroy the German submarine bases 
from the air due to the U-boat bunkers the 
Germans had constructed In Bruges. By the 
end of 1917, British Vice-Admiral Roger Keyes 
therefore laid plans to close off the ports of 
Zeebrugge and Ostend from the sea.
The plan
The British planned to block the ports of 
Ostend and Zeebrugge by s inking obsolete 
warships filled w ith concrete across the 
harbour channel. This way, the German 
submarines and torpedo boats would be 
tem porarily or permanently trapped In the 
Belgian ports. It took a great deal of time to 
draw up the plans for the raids. Especially 
the old mole at Zeebrugge was a source of 
great concern to the British. The Germans 
had fortified this two kilometre long arched 
je tty  enclosing the harbour w ith a series of 
batteries that protected the entire port. To 
make sure the blockshlps would enter the 
harbour channel smoothly, It was crucial to 
divert the batteries on the mole. This 
required British troops to land on the mole. 
Three ships were converted to transport 
these troops: the obsolete cruiser FIMS 
Vindictive and the ferries FIMS Iris and FIMS 
Daffodil. While the troops were landing, an 
old submarine had to blow Itse lf up under 
the viaduct connectlngthe mole to the shore. 
This would prevent German reinforcements 
from coming to the rescue of the ir fellow 
combatants on the mole. The three 
blockshlps FIMS Thetis, FIMS Intrep id  and 
FIMS Iphigenia  would In the meantime enter 
the harbour channel more or less 
undisturbedly and be scuttled at the 
entrance. Of course, the Germans would see 
these ships coming from a great distance. For 
this reason the British planned to use small 
fast boats to create a smoke screen.
At first sight, the situation ln Ostend was 
much simpler. Several batteries and machine 
gun nests protected this harbour as well, but 
there was no arched mole. It therefore 
seemed unnecessary for troops to land. It 
seemed sufficient to scuttle the blockshlps 
FIMS Sirius and FIMS B rillian t across the 
harbour channel.
A few crucial factors for the success o f the 
attack plan were the weather, the tide and 
the tim ing. Calm weather was required for 
the optimal deployment of the small boats 
and for the success of the landing on the 
mole In Zeebrugge. A landward wind had to 
keep the smoke screen In front of the ships. 
High tide was required for the troops to scale 
the high mole and for the heavily laden 
blockshlps to enter the harbour channel 
smoothly. Finally, all these conditions had to 
be fu lfilled  around m idnight to optim ally use
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the cover of darkness. The changeable 
weather resulted In two cancelled attempts. 
The fleet put out to sea for a third tim e In the 
evening of 22 April 1918.
The Zeebrugge Raid: 
22 April 1918
The two fleet segments sailed together for 
a few miles and then the ir paths parted. Both 
fleets were planned to arrive at Zeebrugge 
and Ostend sim ultaneously so that the 
Germans would not have time to warn each 
other, since the plans for the raid had already 
fallen Into German hands during a previous 
attempt. When the Germans heard the ship 
engines In Zeebrugge, they In itia lly  thought 
an airborne attack was coming. After a while 
they realised that what they thought was fog 
was actually a smoke screen, and they sent 
up a few flares. They subsequently spotted 
the British funnels and Immediately sounded 
the alarm throughout the coastline. Flares 
and searchlights Illum inated the entire mole. 
The ship engines were now clearly audible, 
but the approachlngfog veiled the vessels. 
British monitors now began to shell the 
German positions.
Just before m idnight a sudden gust of 
wind blew away the smoke screen. The 
contours of FIMS Vindictive were now clearly 
visible. The German batteries were In combat 
readiness and opened fire. By the tim e FIMS 
Vindictive had reached Its position alongside 
the mole, most of the gangplanks specially
Position o f  the blockships HMS Iphigenia and  HMS Intrepid in Zeebrugge harbour 
after the ra id  (Bruges C ity  Archives, Zeebruggefonds)
Plan o f  Zeebrugge harbour with the position o f  the blockships that were to close o ff  the po rt 
(Bruges C ity  Archives, Zeebruggefonds}
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mounted for the landing had been destroyed. 
Half of the soldiers who had waited on deck 
for the landing had already been killed 
or wounded. Yet the ship continued her 
course. HMS Iris and HMS Daffodil were also 
approaching the mole. At about a quarter 
past m idnight the first troops landed on 
the mole, while the British submarine blew 
herself up and destroyed the viaduct almost 
simultaneously. The landing force destroyed 
a few machine gun nests and artille ry  pieces. 
At about ha lf past m idnight the blockships 
passed the mole. HMS Thetis, which led 
the way, im m ediately came under heavy 
fire. When entering the harbour, the ship 
got entangled in the nets the Germans had 
installed and ran aground. The crew scuttled 
the ship prematurely. HMS Intrep id  and HMS 
Iphigenia  succeeded in reaching the harbour 
entrance w ithout being noticed. Their crews 
tried to position the ships across the harbour 
channel as best they could before detonating 
the charges. The raid appeared to be 
successful and the British pulled out.
Ostend, an attack 
in two episodes
HMS Sirius and B rillian t encountered 
more d ifficu lties when they approached 
Ostend. The smoke screen was unexpectedly 
blown away, so that the two ships were 
an easy target. British monitors shelled 
the German batteries but were unable to 
elim inate them. Heavy rain obstructed 
the ir view and the Germans had moved the 
navigation buoy that marked the harbour 
entrance. As a result, the two ships did not 
find the entranceway and were eventually
scuttled outside the port, towards Bredene. 
The First Ostend Raid was a complete failure.
A second attempt was made on 9 May. 
This time HMS Vindictive, hastily repaired 
after the Zeebrugge Raid, and HMS Sappho 
had to block the harbour channel. HMS 
Sappho never reached Ostend due to a 
mechanical breakdown. HMS Vindictive did 
make the journey, but once again finding 
the harbour entrance was not easy. After 
steaming back and forth near the harbour, 
the ship eventually made it to the entrance. 
HMS Vindictive entered the harbour under 
heavy German fire. The damage sustained 
during the first raid was exacerbated and 
one of the propellers broke down. Because 
of the broken propeller, Vindictive had 
d ifficu lty  manoeuvring. It soon appeared to 
be impossible to position the crippled vessel 
across the harbour channel. The commander 
then scuttled the ship on site. The harbour 
channel was only partly blocked. This made 
the second attempt not an unqualified 
success either.
Mission accomplished?
The two raids together claimed the lives of 
over 200 British soldiers. The Germans only 
sustained a few casualties. In light of the 
losses suffered on the Yser front, th is number 
was acceptable to the British. But had the 
operation been successful? How was this raid 
perceived by both parties? What effect did 
this operation have on the further course of 
the war? To find an answer to the question 
whether the British had achieved the ir goal, 
it is sufficient to check whether the harbour 
mouths of Zeebrugge and Ostend had indeed
been closed off. In Ostend this was not the 
case. HMS Vindictive had been unable to 
position itse lf across the harbour channel 
due to a broken propeller. In Zeebrugge, HMS 
Intrep id  and Iphigenia  were better 
positioned, yet a new channel was created 
behind the blockships after only a few days. 
U-boats and destroyers could therefore leave 
the ports again soon after the raid. However, 
the raids were a moral v ictory for the British. 
They had not achieved the anticipated goal, 
but the raids were promoted as a British 
victory. The British propaganda machine 
depicted the entire operation as an 
unqualified success. For weeks it was 
claimed that the Belgian ports had indeed 
been closed off, although numerous 
photographs proved the contrary. The 
participants were honoured for the ir bravery. 
No less than eleven Victoria Crosses, the 
highest m ilitary decoration in the United 
Kingdom, were awarded for the exploits of 
the British troops during the raids. Moreover, 
this operation had proved that the British 
could breach the German coastal defences. 
The raids certainly boosted Allied morale 
after the disillusionm ent of the Battle of 
Passchendaele. The Germans, on the other 
hand, minimised the results of the raids. The 
officia l report by Grand Admiral Alfred von 
Tirpitz states that little  damage had been 
done to the port infrastructure and that there 
hardly had been any casualties. German 
propaganda represented the British failure as 
proof of the ir superior defence o f the ports. It 
was pointed out that vessels could already 
leave the ports after a few days. In reality, 
German self-confidence took a terrib le knock. 
The aim of the raids had not been achieved, 
but the British had succeeded in breaking
The sunken Vindictive aga inst the Ostend p ie r (collection o f  Freddy Hubrechtsenj
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through the German coastal defences several 
times and had tem porarily set foot on land. 
As a result, the Germans constructed 
additional fortifications afterwards, 
particularly at the ports.
The threat eliminated
After the raids, the number of Allied 
ships sunk by the Marine Corps dropped 
significantly. If this was not due to the raids, 
what was the reason for th is decrease? The 
answer to this question Is complex. Several 
British bombings caused the floodgates to 
function only sporadically until the end of 
June. But this only caused a temporary delay. 
However, the depletion of raw materials 
In Germany after nearly four years of war 
resulted In the production of new ships 
fa lling  behind. In 1918 the Allies also applied 
a few tested as well as new techniques on 
a structural basis to counter the submarine 
danger.
The Allies had reverted to using escorted 
convoys In 1917. Convoying had proved 
Its usefulness many centuries before. The 
¡dea Is simple: merchant ships travelling 
together under the protection of a naval 
escort. It Is surprising, then, that the Allies 
In itia lly  did not use this technique during 
the First World War. The arguments against 
convoys were diverse. If a convoy ran Into 
an enemy battleship, It did not have the 
ghost of a chance unless It was protected 
by a battleship as well. Having every convoy 
escorted by a battleship was much too 
expensive, however. Sailing In convoy also 
meant that the group could only go as fast as 
the slowest ship. Moreover, ships had to wait 
In port until a new convoy put out to sea. The 
Allies believed this would lead to loss of time 
and efficiency. Finally, the British thought 
unloading an entire convoy would exceed the 
capacity of many ports.
These arguments were refuted one 
by one, however. The British blockade of 
German battleships prevented them from 
moving freely to attack convoys. The loss of 
efficiency and time turned out to be greater 
when a ship was sunk. And tim ely notice 
prior to the arrival of a convoy ensured 
that the port In question could prepare for 
unloading the ships. Convoys were gradually 
Introduced and w ith success. Several new 
techniques also showed great promise. In 
late 1917 the British developed ASDIC, the 
w orld ’s first active sonar technology. This 
apparatus emits acoustic pulses which 
reflect o ff submerged objects and these 
echoes are then received by the apparatus. 
The apparatus determines the depth 
(distance) of an object by measuring the time 
between em itting and receiving a pulse. The 
First World War also saw the development of 
the depth charge, designed for detonation at 
a preset depth. Sonar and the depth charge 
would both turn out to be very powerful an ti­
submarine weapons.
This pa in ting  in Zeebrugge Community Centre depicts the Zeebrugge ra id  in a dram atic manner 
(Decleer)
A  British convoy o f  the Royal N a v y  z igzags through a danger area in the A tlan tic Ocean  
(Imperial W ar Museums, Q 19954]
Vice-Admiral Roger Keyes did not just 
plan and lead the Zeebrugge and Ostend 
raids, he also took numerous other measures 
to hinder German shipp ing In the English 
Channel. For Instance, he had additional 
anti-submarine nets w ith mines Installed 
and Introduced search-and-destroy patrols.
U-boats were then faced w ith the risk 
o f being sunk by the patrols or getting 
entangled In mine nets. All these measures 
and circumstances made It Increasingly 
d ifficu lt for the German submarines and 
torpedo boats In the Channel to disrupt 
Allied supply lines.
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Left: the o rig ina l monument on the corner o f  De M aere laan and  Zeed ijk  in Zeebrugge was pu lled dow n during the Second W orld  W ar and  
taken to Germany. The current monument dates from 1984.
Right: fragments o f  the mole with which HMS Vindictive collided, now  located on A d m iraa l Keyesplein in Zeebrugge  
(Tolhuis Provincial Library/
A boost to Allied morale
The Zeebrugge and Ostend raids 
certainly boosted the morale of the Entente 
Powers. The bravery of the men who took 
part and the subsequent reports in the 
press renewed the faith of the soldiers in 
trenches in victory. This boost came just 
at the right moment after the failure of the 
battle of Passchendaele and especially 
after the frustrations and concern caused 
by the German spring offensive. At the 
same tim e, the actual effect of the raids 
was at first greatly overestimated by the 
Allies, in tentionally or unintentionally.
The sunken ships only caused moderate 
interference. After a few days, the German 
warships were able to put out to sea again. 
The decreasing number of torpedoed Allied 
ships was m ostly due to the depletion o f raw 
materials, the introduction of convoys, the 
application of new techniques and Roger 
Keyes’ anti-submarine measures. In any case, 
the example of the Zeebrugge and Ostend 
raids was followed in the Second World War. 
On 28 March 1942 the British conducted 
a successful raid on Saint-Nazaire. This 
destroyed the dry dock of the principal port 
on the Atlantic coast and the only dry dock 
large enough to repair battleships. From 
then on, German warships had to return to 
Germany for repairs.
Top: the Vindictive m em orial in Ostend  
has recently been moved (Tolhuis Provincial 
Libraryj.
Bottom: the b o w  o f  HMS Vindictive a t the 
new  location near the Oosterstaketsel p ie r in 
Ostend during the solemn inauguration on 2 4  
M a y  2 0 1 3  (M arn ix  Pieters, Flanders Heritage  
A gencyj
Current memorials to the 
Zeebrugge and Ostend raids
Nowadays, several memorials, both in 
Britain and in Belgium, remind us of the 
operations that took place in April and May 
1918. In Zeebrugge, on the corner of Zeedijk 
and Baron de Maerelaan, a monument to 
Saint George’s Day can s till be seen today. 
The look o f the monument has remained 
unchanged since 1984. A plan of Zeebrugge 
harbour at the tim e of the raid is flanked by 
commemorative plates for the blockships 
and the submarine. On Admiraal Keyesplein, 
also in Zeebrugge, a memorial has been 
erected w ith fragments of the mole with 
which HMS Vindictive collided during the 
landing of troops.
And the bow of HMS Vindictive as well as 
the masts of HMS Thetis and Intrep id  were 
located at Graaf de Smet de Naeyerlaan in 
Ostend for many years; now, after a recent 
restoration, they are displayed near the 
eastern pier of the port of Ostend.
Sources
•  D e  G ro o t  B . (2 0 1 2 ) .  V a n  D u its e  B o c h t  t o t  S c a p a  F lo w . D e 
o o r lo g  t e r  z e e  1 9 1 4 -1 9 1 8 .
•  D e s e y n e  A . ( 2 0 0 7 ) .  D e k u s t  b e z e t  1 9 1 4 -1 9 1 8 , B r u g g e .
•  D e V o s  L. ( 2 0 0 3 ) .  D e  E e rs te  W e r e ld o o r lo g ,  L e u v e n .
•  K a ra u  M .  ( 2 0 0 3 ) .  W ie ld in g  t h e  D a g g e r .  T h e  M a r in e k o r p s  
F la n d e rn  a n d  th e  G e rm a n  W a r  E f fo r t  1 9 1 4 -1 9 1 8 , W e s tp o r t .
•  P r in c e  S . (2 0 1 0 ) .  T h e  b lo c k in g  o f  Z e e b r u g g e .  O p e r a t io n  Z - 0  
1 9 1 8 , O x fo rd .
•  R y h e u lJ .  (2 0 1 0 ) .  M a r in e k o r p s  F la n d e r n ,  E re m b o d e g e m .
32 VLIZ IDE GROTE REDE] 2 0 1 3 •  36
